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ABSTRACT
Many American communities seek to attract or retain businesses with tax abatements, tax credits, or
tax increment financing of infrastructure projects (TIFs).  The evidence for 1999 indicates that communities
are most likely to offer one or more of these business development incentives if their residents have
low incomes, if they are located close to state borders, and if their states have troubled political cultures.
Ten percent greater median household income is associated with a 3.2 percent lower probability of
offering incentives; ten percent greater distance from a state border is associated with a 1.0 percent
lower probability of offering incentives; and a 10 percent higher rate at which government officials
are convicted of federal corruption crimes is associated with a 1.2 percent greater probability of offering
business incentives.  TIFs are the preferred incentive of communities whose residents have household
incomes between $25,000 and $75,000; whereas TIFs are much less commonly offered by communities
whose residents have household incomes below $25,000.  The need to finance TIFs out of incremental
tax revenues may make it infeasible for many of the poorest of communities to use TIFs for local business
development.
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1. Introduction 
Local governments in the United States compete with each other to attract businesses and 
thereby enhance the economic prospects of local residents. This competition takes many forms, 
commonly including offers of tax-based incentives to firms that can be induced to establish, 
expand, or maintain local business operations.  These tax-based incentives consist of direct tax 
benefits, that include abatements of existing taxes or credits against potential tax liabilities, and 
the use of tax increment financing (TIFs) of business-oriented infrastructure projects. 
Despite the attractiveness of encouraging local business activity, many jurisdictions in the 
United States have been unwilling to provide tax-based business development incentives.  This 
reluctance stems from many sources, including the potential revenue costs of such concessions, 
doubts about their effectiveness in encouraging business activity, a philosophy that across the 
board tax reductions are more effective than targeted tax incentives, and perhaps an evaluation 
that the benefits of greater business activity are not worth the costs.  Communities with differing 
economies and demographics may well evaluate these tradeoffs differently.  Furthermore, even 
governments of communities that agree on the potential value of targeted tax incentives may not 
all offer them, given the realities of bureaucratic and political barriers to implementing programs 
that require effective action. 
The goal of this paper is to understand why cities and counties offer the tax-based 
business incentives that they do.  The analysis starts by identifying the characteristics of U.S. 
communities that are associated with provision of tax-based business incentives.  Then the 
empirical work considers only those communities that provide incentives, distinguishing features 
associated with providing TIFs from features associated with providing tax abatements and 
credits. 
Several patterns are evident in the data.  Heavily populated cities and counties, those with 
low median incomes, and those with larger concentrations of manufacturing industries, are the 
most likely to offer business incentives.  The correlations of these characteristics and the 
provision of business incentives at least in part reflect the value that communities with economic 
needs attach to attracting new employment opportunities, and the willingness of these 
communities to forego tax revenue in order to get these opportunities.   2
Communities with lower incomes are more likely than others to offer business tax 
incentives, but this proclivity is no more pronounced among those with higher fractions of very 
poor residents (below $25,000 household income) than it is among communities with higher 
fractions of middle income residents ($25,000 - $75,000 household income).  The need for 
economic activity may be greatest in the poorest communities, but business tax incentives 
somewhat less effective there than elsewhere, and more difficult for local governments to 
implement. 
Two additional noteworthy features characterize communities offering business tax 
incentives.  The first is that communities located close to state borders are significantly more 
likely than others to offer incentives.  Proximity to other states increases the competitiveness of 
the environment for attracting business, driving communities to offer attractive packages even to 
retain existing businesses.  Furthermore, the prospect of attracting businesses and accompanying 
tax revenue from other states may increase the willingness of state governments to offer financial 
and other assistance to their own communities that provide business development incentives.   
The second feature is that cities and counties in states with troubled political cultures 
demonstrate the greatest willingness to offer business development incentives, the evidence 
indicating that increasing the rate at which government officials are convicted of federal 
corruption crimes by 1 per 100,000 residents over a 13 year period is associated with a 2.9 
percent greater chance that a community will offer business incentives.  While it may be 
farfetched to interpret this evidence to suggest that small numbers of corrupt and quasi-corrupt 
government officials in these jurisdictions provide business incentives in return for cash, political  
support, or other forms of payouts, a different, and perhaps only slightly more flattering, 
interpretation is that jurisdictions in states with troubled political cultures are more likely than 
others to have dysfunctional tax and regulatory systems that make it difficult for them to 
compete for businesses except by offering special incentives. 
The second part of the paper’s empirical investigation considers only those communities 
offering some business tax incentives, identifying the characteristics associated with provision of 
direct tax reductions, in the form of tax abatements or tax credits, rather than provision of 
infrastructure improvements (such as new roads and sewer facilities) facilitated by tax increment 
financing.  Tax increment financing typically entails debt-financed projects for which subsequent   3
additional revenue (arguably) attributable to enhanced business activity is devoted to paying off 
the debts incurred in undertaking the infrastructure improvements.  Among jurisdictions that 
offer incentives, those with significant numbers of households with incomes less than $25,000 
are the most likely to offer tax reductions rather than TIF-supported infrastructure programs, 
whereas those with significant numbers of households with incomes between $25,000-$75,000 
are the most likely to offer TIFs rather than tax reductions.  By this measure TIFs appear not to 
be effectively directed toward the lowest-income communities.  And political culture appears to 
influence the form as well as the level of development incentives: increasing the rate at which 
government officials are convicted of federal corruption crimes by 1 per 100,000 residents over a 
13 year period is associated with a 5.9 percent greater probability that a community will offer tax 
reductions rather than TIFs. 
Government expenditures on core infrastructure such as roads and utilities are potentially 
influenced by some of the same considerations that prompt adoption of business-directed TIF 
programs, so it is instructive to compare patterns of infrastructure spending with provision of 
business incentives in the form of TIFs.  The evidence indicates that middle-income communities 
are no more likely than low-income communities to concentrate their government expenditures 
on infrastructure, which is very different than the pattern of TIF provision.  The infrastructure 
spending pattern suggests that low-income communities fail to offer TIFs not because local 
infrastructure is unproductive, but for some other reason – possibly related to the difficulty of 
obtaining financing.  Additionally, government infrastructure spending shares the feature of TIFs 
of being concentrated in communities whose states have less troubled political cultures. 
The empirical patterns are consistent with purposeful choice of business development 
incentives.  Communities with low-income residents stand to benefit from employment and other 
economic opportunities that accompany greater business operations, but are often unable to use 
TIF programs due to the inability of even enhanced business activity to generate sufficient local 
tax revenue to retire debts acquired in undertaking the accompanying infrastructure projects.  
Self-interest of a different kind may be at work in the proclivity of communities in states with 
higher rates of federal corruption convictions to favor direct tax benefits over TIFs, though this 
pattern may also reflect bond market skepticism of the ability and willingness of troubled 
political systems to repay in full any obligations incurred in the course of providing business 
infrastructure.   4
The second section of the paper discusses the challenges that communities face in using 
business development incentives to attract and retain business activity.  The third section 
describes the available data on the practices of American communities in offering tax-based 
business incentives in 1999. The fourth section presents the results of estimating the 
determinants of who offers business incentives; the fifth section presents the results of 
estimating, among communities offering some kind of incentive, the determinants of who offers 
tax reductions or TIFs to the exclusion of the other.  The sixth section compares TIF provision to 
government expenditures on infrastructure, and the seventh section is the conclusion. 
 
2.  Business Development Incentives 
  Business development incentives have the potential to attract investment, employment, 
and net tax revenues to communities offering them.  Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) identify the 
efficiency costs that jurisdictions incur by attempting to tax returns earned by mobile business 
capital, noting that taxes on less-mobile factors are apt to entail smaller costs with the same 
distributional effects, particularly for jurisdictions that are too small to affect market rates of 
return.
1 Tax abatements, tax credits and TIFs, if offered on a selective basis to the most mobile 
businesses, and those that generate spillovers to other firms, can permit communities to maintain 
business, property, and sales taxes that generate revenue without reducing business activity to the 
same degree that they would in the absence of incentives.
2  As a practical matter, however, given 
the difficulty of distinguishing businesses on the basis of potential mobility, and the restricted set 
of tax instruments available to local communities, governments face tradeoffs between raising 
tax revenues and attracting business activity. 
Despite their obvious appeal to investors, it is not guaranteed that business development 
incentives encourage local economic activity, as incentives can be costly, possibly coming at the 
expense of general tax reductions, education or infrastructure improvements, or other uses of 
funds that could impact business activity to an even greater extent than do incentives.  Bartik 
(1991) offers a critical survey of earlier empirical studies of the impact of state and local 
                                                 
1 See Gordon (1986) for an elaboration of this argument and Gordon and Hines (2002) for a further exposition. 
2 Keen (2001) and Hong and Smart (2010) analyze the welfare consequences of distinguishing the tax treatment of 
more-mobile and less-mobile investments in settings in which jurisdictions compete for mobile investments; Garcia-
Mila and McGuire (2002) consider tax incentives in an environment in which there are agglomeration economies.   5
economic development policies, and business tax incentives in particular; Wasylenko (1997) and 
Fisher and Peters (1997) provide updates and extensions.  Most of the surveyed studies, 
including Newman (1983), Wasylenko and McGuire (1985), and Papke (1994), conclude that 
provision of business tax incentives contributes to local business investment, employment, and 
economic growth, though others, including Carlton (1983) and Boarnet and Bogart (1996), report 
few or no discernible effects.  Since the level of local economic activity is influenced by many 
considerations, it can be difficult to identify the impact of development incentives independently 
of other factors that may be correlated with provision of incentives.  For example, some 
communities offering incentives may do so because they would otherwise have little economic 
activity, or fear that economic activity would decline; whereas others offer incentives as part of a 
package of successful business-friendly measures, including robust underlying growth trends. 
More recent studies attempt to evaluate the effect of business development incentives in 
ways that attempt to limit the potential impact of omitted variables.  Several of these studies 
concern enterprise and empowerment zone programs that provide packages of tax reductions and 
credits.  O’Keefe (2004) uses propensity score matching to compare the experiences of 
California communities designated as enterprise zones with otherwise-similar communities that 
were not enterprise zones, finding that enterprise zone designation is associated with more rapid 
employment growth; Neumark and Kolko (2010) revisit the California enterprise zone program 
using later data and more fine-grained geographical information, reporting insignificant 
employment effects.  Hanson (2009) considers communities throughout the United States 
designated as federal empowerment zones and others that unsuccessfully applied for 
empowerment zone designation; a simple comparison indicates that empowerment zone 
designation is accompanied by rising employment and declining poverty rates, though these 
effects are insignificant in instrumental variables specifications.  Greenstone and Moretti (2003) 
compare income and property value growth in counties that received “million dollar plants” – 
very large new investments – to income and property value growth in counties that just missed 
being chosen as locations for the new plants. The study reports significant differences, with 
earnings in affected industries, and property values generally, growing more rapidly in the 
winning counties. This finding is consistent with evidence for Michigan (Anderson, 1990) and 
Indiana (Man and Rosentraub, 1998) that property values grow more rapidly in cities offering   6
TIFs than in observationally-similar cities that do not, though Dye and Merriman (2000) report 
the opposite result for cities in the Chicago area.   
Effects of incentives appear to differ according to the setting.  For example, Hoyt, Jepsen 
and Troske (2008) find that training and tax incentives provided by Kentucky positively affect 
employment in counties receiving the incentives, and report that the effects are particularly 
strong in counties along the state border; Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007) offer evidence that 
enterprise zone programs in ten states encourage employment and capital spending by new 
establishments to a greater degree than existing establishments. 
Communities differ in their willingness to offer business development incentives.  In an 
extensive review of the earlier literature, Wolman and Spitzley (1996) document the many 
variables that have been used to explain the proclivity to offer incentives, including, most 
frequently, local government structure, fiscal stress, economic need, economic distress, 
economic openness or citizen access, and city size. For example, Anderson (1990) finds a 
positive correlation between prior high property value growth and TIF adoption by Michigan 
cities, suggesting that TIFs are more likely to be used in cities that experience and anticipate 
rapid property value growth, though it is difficult to establish the direction of causality. Man 
(1999) finds that low income Indiana communities are the most likely to adopt TIFs, and that 
declining intergovernmental aid, growth in property tax liabilities, adoption of TIFs by 
neighboring jurisdictions, a high concentration of service industries, a high property tax price of 
local public goods, and existing use of property tax abatements are all positively correlated with 
TIF adoption.  Byrne (2005) reports similar evidence that Chicago area communities are more 
likely to offer TIFs if their neighbors do so, and within the city of Chicago, Gibson (2003) finds 
that disadvantaged neighborhoods (though not the very poorest) are the most likely to offer TIFs.  
Anderson and Wassmer (1995) find similar patterns in the adoption of property tax abatements: 
in their panel of Detroit metropolitan area communities, those with higher incomes and higher 
property tax prices of local public services wait longer to offer property tax abatements.  To a 
certain degree, differences in willingness to offer incentives may reflect the composition of the 
industries and firms that are potential beneficiaries: Byrnes, Marvel and Sridhar (1999) find that 
Ohio jurisdictions are more likely to offer tax abatements to firms with higher credit ratings and 
those offering to create significant numbers of new jobs, which is consistent with evidence   7
provided by Fisher and Peters (1998) that business development incentives are concentrated 
among large plants. 
There is limited existing research on the determinants of the type of incentive a 
jurisdiction offers. One such study by Rubin and Rubin (1987) examines the choice by Illinois 
cities to offer cash subsidies, revenue bonds, water rate reductions or infrastructure to attract and 
retain business activity. The study reports that cities with low incomes and high unemployment 
are more likely than affluent cities to offer infrastructure improvements, tax abatements and 
TIFs, but no more likely to offer less expensive alternatives, such as industrial revenue bonds; 
furthermore, cities with large internal employment and high administrative capacity are the most 
likely to offer any kind of incentive. 
 
3.  Tax-Based Business Incentives in 1999 
The empirical work described in sections 4, 5 and 6 of the paper is based on information 
drawn from a survey of the chief development officers of American municipalities and counties 
by the International City/County Management Association (ICMA), a trade association of local 
government officials.  The survey was conducted between fall 1999 and spring 2000.
3  The 
ICMA received 1,042 replies to 3,308 surveys distributed during that period, for a response rate 
of 31.5 percent.  Among many other questions, this survey asks respondents to indicate “which 
of the following incentives your local government offers,” with separate choices including tax 
abatements, tax credits, and tax increment financing.
4   A small number of the respondents in the 
ICMA survey did not answer the questions regarding economic development incentives. Among 
the 1,022 useable replies, 68 percent of the respondents report offering some kind of economic 
development incentive, and 56 percent report offering some kind of tax incentive.  36 percent 
report offering tax abatements, 17 percent report offering tax credits, and 34 percent report 
                                                 
3 These data are available at: http://bookstore.icma.org/Economic_Development_1999_Data_C92.cfm.  The ICMA 
administered similar surveys of American cities and counties in 2004 and 2009, but with significantly smaller 
sample sizes, which is why this paper analyzes the 1999 data. 
4 The complete list of potential incentives identified on the survey instrument is: tax abatements, tax credits, locally 
designated enterprise zones, federal/state designated enterprise zones, tax increment financing, grants, infrastructure 
programs, free land or land write downs, employee screening, training support, utility rate reduction, zoning/permit 
assistance, regulatory flexibility, relocation assistance, low-cost loans, one-stop permit issuance, special assessment 
districts, subsidized buildings, and other.   8
offering TIFs.  These summary statistics along with other variables used in the empirical analysis 
are presented in Table 1. 
The ICMA data were matched to U.S. Census of Population data on population 
characteristics for the same jurisdictions for 2000.  Median household incomes of communities 
surveyed by the ICMA had a mean of $46,815 in 1999; the mean percentage of households with 
incomes below $25,000 was 27 percent, and the mean percentage of households with incomes 
between $25,000 and $75,000 was 48 percent.  The population represented in this sample 
averages slightly more income than the U.S. population as a whole.
5 Among the communities in 
the ICMA sample, an average of 2.6 percent of workers over 16 used public transportation to 
commute to work in 2000, and an average of 14 percent of the population was employed in 
manufacturing.   
The ICMA data also were matched to U.S. Census of Governments data on public 
finances for 1997. A measure of local core infrastructure spending was calculated by combining 
expenditures on air transportation, general public buildings, regular highways, toll highways, 
private transit subsidies, parking facilities, sewerage, solid waste, sea and inland port facilities, 
water utilities, electric utilities, gas utilities, and transit utilities. Core infrastructure spending 
averages 35 percent of total local government spending by the sampled communities. 
Distances (in meters) from the center of each jurisdiction to the center of the nearest 
place (as defined by the National Historical Geographic Information System) located in another 
state were calculated using ArcGIS. Among the jurisdictions in the sample, the mean distance to 
the nearest city center across a state border is 129 kilometers. 
State level variables were compiled from several sources.  Information on top statutory 
state corporate tax rates, state sales tax rates, and state personal income tax rates was drawn from 
the World Tax Database (Office of Tax Policy Research, 2008).  Total state tax revenue per 
capita was calculated using 1999 state tax revenue and population data from the U.S. Census 
Annual Survey of State Government Finances. Corruption rates were obtained from Glaeser and 
Saks (2004), who report information on rates at which federal, state and local public officials in 
                                                 
5 In 1999, the median household income in the United States was $41,994, 28.7% of U.S. households earned less 
than $25,000, and 49% earned between $25,000 and $75,000.  Since the ICMA data correspond to unweighted 
community means, whereas the U.S. data can be treated as community means weighted by population, the two sets 
of figures are not exactly comparable.   9
each state were convicted of federal corruption-related crimes between 1990 and 2002; their 
figures correspond to total convictions per 100,000 state residents (measured as the average of 
1990 and 2000 Census populations) over this 13-year period. A dummy variable indicating 
whether a state permitted its local jurisdictions to offer TIFs in 1999 was created using 
information on state TIF statutes compiled by the Council of Development Finance Agencies 
(2008).  Since highly motivated communities were able to avoid state TIF restrictions with 
creative policies, the TIF prohibitions are not absolute; and indeed, of the 346 communities that 
report offering TIFs in 1999, 14 are located in states that are coded as prohibiting TIFs. 
The analysis that follows investigates the extent to which these community and state 
characteristics are associated with provision of business development incentives.  Sample sizes 
vary depending on specification, and to date it has been possible to establish distances to the 
closest town in neighboring states for only 988 jurisdictions. The first part of the analysis 
concerns the determinants of whether or not a community offers tax incentives. The second part 
of the analysis considers only those communities offering tax incentives, evaluating the factors 
associated with offering TIFs to the exclusion of tax abatements or tax credits.  
The rationale behind the second part of the analysis is that there is an unobserved 
community factor that influences whether to offer tax-based development incentives, and that 
this factor has the same effect on offering TIFs as it does on offering tax abatements and tax 
credits.  It is then possible to identify the effect of other variables on this choice using the 
Chamberlain (1980) fixed effects logit procedure, in which the sample is selected to include only 
those jurisdictions either offering TIFs but not tax abatements or credits, or else offering either or 
both of tax abatements and credits, but not TIFs.  This restriction further reduces the sample size 
to 346 in some specifications, and 332 in specifications including the distance variable. 
 
4.  Features of Jurisdictions Offering Business Development Incentives 
There are noticeable differences between the population sizes and average incomes of 
communities offering tax incentives and those that do not.  Figure 1 depicts fractions of sample 
jurisdictions offering tax incentives – tax abatements, tax credits or TIFs – in 1999.  The two 
leftmost bars in the figure indicate that lower income communities are particularly likely to offer 
tax incentives: 65 percent of those with household median incomes below $34,000 offered tax   10
incentives, whereas only 42 percent of households with median incomes exceeding $55,450 did 
so.  The second set of bars in Figure 1 reveal that communities with larger populations are more 
likely than others to offer tax incentives: 50 percent of communities with populations below 
19,307 offered incentives, while 59 percent of communities with populations exceeding 75,400 
did so.
6 
The income and population differences evident in the first and second sets of bars in 
Figure 1 appear to be statistically significant in regressions explaining propensities to offer tax 
incentives.  The first column of Table 2 presents estimated coefficients from logit regressions in 
which the dependent variable takes the value one if a community reports offering any of tax 
abatements, tax credits, or TIFs to attract businesses, and zero if the community does not offer 
any of these incentives.  The -1.2936 coefficient in column 1 indicates that, conditional on 
population size, lower income communities are significantly more likely than affluent 
communities to offer tax incentives.  Evaluating the logit function at the sample means, the -
1.2936 coefficient magnitude implies that an additional 10 percent of household median income 
is associated with a 3.2 percent lower likelihood that a community will offer some kind of tax 
incentive.  The 0.3102 coefficient implies that greater population is associated with significantly 
enhanced likelihood of offering tax incentives, a 10 percent greater population being associated 
with a 0.8 percent greater likelihood of offering tax incentives (in this and subsequent cases, the 
impact of small changes are evaluated at sample means).  
Each regression also includes controls for whether the observation is a county and 
whether the jurisdiction is located in a state that allowed TIFs in 1999. The -0.7797 coefficient 
indicates that counties are less likely to use tax incentives compared to cities and towns.
7 Not 
surprisingly, jurisdictions located in states that allow TIFs are more likely to use tax incentives.
8 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 report modifications of this specification that consider 
aspects of income distribution other than just median income.  The 3.0783 coefficient in the 
                                                 
6 Cutoff values of income, population, and other variables used to construct the bar charts presented in Figures 1-4 
and A1-A4 are chosen so that the bars correspond to the highest and lowest 25 percent of the sample; for example, 
of 1022 communities in the sample, 256 have median incomes below $34,000, and 256 have median incomes above 
$55,450. 
7 Of the 1022 jurisdictions in the sample, 127, or 12.4%, are counties. 
8 According to the Council of Development Finance Agencies, nine states did not have TIF statutes in 1999 
including Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Kentucky, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New Jersey, Washington and 
West Virginia. By 2010, every state except Arizona had a TIF statute.   11
second column indicates that communities are more likely to offer incentives if they have larger 
fractions of their resident households with incomes below $25,000.  Evaluated at data means, 
this coefficient together with the logit function implies that a 10 percent greater fraction of 
households with incomes below $25,000 is associated with a 7.6 percent greater likelihood of 
offering tax incentives.  The 4.2498 coefficient in the same column indicates that a higher 
fraction of households with incomes between $25,000 and $75,000 is likewise associated with 
offering tax incentives; evaluated at sample means, the estimate implies that a 10 percent greater 
fraction of households with income between $25,000 and $75,000 is associated with a 10.5 
percent greater likelihood of offering tax incentives.  Greater population increases the chance of 
offering incentives to the same extent that it does in the regression reported in column 1. 
The estimates in this regression appear to suggest that reducing a household’s income 
from say $35,000 to $20,000 reduces the chance that the community in which it is resident will 
offer tax-based business incentives.  This is not necessarily inconsistent with the regression 
results in column 1 (since the community’s median household income will be affected only if 
$35,000 is below its median, which is unlikely), but nevertheless somewhat surprising.  The 
regression reported in column 3 tests whether there is a significant difference between the effects 
of a greater fraction of households with incomes under $25,000 and the fraction of households 
with incomes between $25,000 and $75,000, finding that there is not: the -1.1714 coefficient is 
statistically insignificant.  The subsequent regressions in Tables 2 and 3 obtain similar results, 
consistently indicating that the likelihood of offering incentives increases with the fraction of 
households with incomes below $75,000, but is insignificantly affected by the distribution of 
low-income households between the under-$25,000 category and the $25,000-$75,000 category. 
The regressions in columns 4-7 of Table 2 add different individual explanatory variables 
to the specification in column 3.  The -3.4491 coefficient in the regression reported in column 4 
indicates that more urbanized communities, as captured by the fraction of their populations using 
public transportation, are less likely than others to offer tax-based development incentives.   
The regression reported in column 5 of Table 2 includes as an explanatory variable the 
difference between the fraction of the population 65 years and older and the fraction 18 years and 
younger.  Government spending tends to be greater in jurisdictions with younger populations 
(e.g., Case et al., 1993), which in turn may affect tax rates, service levels, and the desirability of   12
locating businesses there.  The estimated -1.5127 coefficient indicates that the proclivity of 
younger communities to offer incentives is significantly different from that of older 
communities, conditional on population size and income distribution; the estimate implies that a 
10 percent greater concentration of young population, or reduced concentration of elderly 
population, is associated with a 3.7 percent higher probability of offering tax incentives. This 
finding is consistent with the third set of bars in Figure 1.  A community is classified as “Young” 
in Figure 1 if the fraction of the population 18 years old and under exceeds the fraction 65 years 
old and older by more than 0.189; conversely, a community is “Old” if the difference in these 
fractions is less than 0.0935.  As the figure indicates, 57 percent of young communities offered 
tax incentives in 1999, whereas only 52 percent of the old communities did so.    
Communities differ in the extent to which local industry is concentrated in 
manufacturing, which in turn is correlated with provision of business development tax 
incentives.  The fourth pair of bars in Figure 1 depicts that communities with less than 8.64 
percent of their workforces employed in manufacturing offer business tax incentives 48 percent 
of the time, whereas communities with greater than 18.3 percent of their workforces in 
manufacturing offer tax incentives 64 percent of the time.  The regression in the sixth column of 
Table 2 includes the share of manufacturing employment as an explanatory variable, the 
estimated 3.3882 coefficient implying that a ten percent greater fraction of the workforce in 
manufacturing is associated with an 8.4 percent greater probability of offering tax incentives. 
The fifth pair of bars in Figure 1 compares the rate at which communities located nearby 
and distant to state borders offer development incentives.  The left bar indicates that 56 percent 
of communities located within 38.35 kilometers of the nearest city center across the state border 
offer tax incentives, while the right bar indicates that only 49 percent of communities located 
more than 220.5 kilometers do so.  The regression reported in column 7 of Table 2 confirms that 
distance to the nearest city center across a state border has a significant effect after controlling 
for population and income distribution, the -0.2759 coefficient implying that ten percent greater 
distance is associated with a 0.7 percent lower probability of offering an incentive. 
The regression reported in column 8 of Table 2 includes measures of a community’s 
income distribution, population, urbanization, age distribution, manufacturing workforce, and 
distance to the nearest state in the same regression.  The estimated coefficients on these   13
independent variables, and implied effects of the variables on likelihood of offering tax 
incentives, are generally similar to those in the previous regressions in which they appeared. The 
exception is the estimated effect of age, which is insignificant in this specification. The estimated 
impact of population increases in this specification, the 0.4562 coefficient implying that 10 
percent greater population is now associated with a 1.1 percent greater chance of offering 
incentives. In addition, the estimated effect of manufacturing share decreases in this 
specification, the estimated 2.1907 coefficient implying that a ten percent greater fraction of the 
workforce in manufacturing is associated with a 5.4 percent greater probability of offering tax 
incentives. 
State policies have the potential to influence community decisions of whether to offer 
business development incentives, and the regressions presented in Table 3 explore the impact of 
these policies.  The regression reported in the first column of Table 3 adds state tax revenue per 
capita to the independent variables included in the regression reported in column 8 of Table 2.  
The 0.4318 coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant. The regression reported in 
column 2 of Table 3 adds state corporate tax rates, sales tax rates, and personal income tax rates 
as explanatory variables.   The -0.1114 coefficient on the state corporate tax rate implies that 
higher state corporate tax rates are associated with a lower proclivity to offer tax incentives. 
However, the 0.3162 coefficient on the state sales tax rate and the 0.1153 coefficient on the state 
personal income tax rate both imply that higher state sales and individual income tax rates are 
associated with greater proclivity to offer tax incentives.  State tax rates affect the returns to 
attracting or retaining businesses, but also reflect state attitudes about the appropriate size of 
government and level of taxation, which is very possibly related to views on tax incentives, 
thereby making it difficult to offer direct interpretations of the tax rate coefficients – other than 
to note that higher personal taxes are associated with greater likelihood of offering incentives, 
and higher business taxes the reverse.  
The sixth set of bars in Figure 1 shows the rate at which communities located in states 
with low and high rates of public corruption convictions provide tax incentives. Jurisdictions 
located in states with high rates of public corruption convictions appear more likely than others 
to offer tax incentives: 67 percent of these communities offer incentives, compared to only 53 
percent of communities in states with low rates of public corruption convictions. Column 3 of 
Table 3 adds the state corruption conviction rate variable to the specification reported in column   14
8 of Table 2, the 0.0776 coefficient indicating that states with more troubled political cultures are 
more likely than others to offer tax incentives.  The estimate implies that increasing the number 
of state corruption convictions by one per 100,000 state residents over the 1990-2002 period is 
associated with a 1.9 percent greater chance that a community will offer business development 
incentives; since the mean number of convictions is 4.0, this corresponds to a 25 percent increase 
in the conviction rate.   
Column 4 of Table 3 presents estimated coefficients from regressions that include all of 
the independent variables appearing in the regression reported in column 8 of Table 2, plus the 
state-level variables of tax revenue per capita, corruption rate, and state corporate tax rates, sales 
tax rates, and personal income tax rates.  The results are quite similar to those in regressions that 
include subsets of the variables, though it is noteworthy that the magnitude of the estimated 
effects of state corruption rates is higher, implying that increasing the number of state corruption 
convictions by one per 100,000 state residents over the 1990-2002 period is now associated with 
a 2.9 percent greater chance that a community will offer business development incentives. The 
estimated effects of manufacturing share and age are no longer statistically significant in this 
specification.  
Overall, regressions in Tables 2 and 3 suggest that jurisdictions are more likely to offer 
tax-based business development incentives if they have higher fractions of households with 
median incomes less than $75,000, have larger populations, are more urbanized, are located 
closer to a state border, and are located in states with relatively troubled political cultures, low 
corporate tax rates, and high personal and sales tax rates.  These patterns suggest that cities and 
counties that, due to their size, urban density, and concentration of low-income residents, stand 
to gain the most from expanding the scale of local economic activity are more likely than others 
to offer business development incentives. Communities, on which competitive pressures bear 
most strongly, including those proximate to state borders and those in states with troubled 
political cultures, are also more likely than others to offer incentives.  It is worth noting that 
simple interpretations of these patterns take community attributes to be independent, and 
therefore unaffected by development policy choices – which has the potential to lead to 
erroneous inference if, for example, certain types of development policies systematically 
influence community income levels.  While it is certainly possible that income levels are affected 
by development policies (indeed, that is often the motivation for the development policies), these   15
effects are unlikely to be so large as to swamp other sources of income differences and thereby 
significantly influence the regression results; moreover, the most likely bias introduced by the 
effect of development policies on local incomes works against the regression pattern that the 
poorest communities are the most likely to offer incentives. 
 
5.  Tax Reductions and TIFs 
 Communities  providing  tax-based  business development incentives differ in the types of 
incentives they offer, and these differences appear to be related to community characteristics.  
Figure 2 depicts the rates at which communities of different incomes – those with median 
household incomes below $34,000, and those with median household incomes above $55,450 – 
offer incentives of different types.  Lower-income communities are more likely to offer tax 
incentives of any type, but this proclivity is most strongly evidenced in providing tax abatements 
and credits, and much less so in providing TIFs.  Among communities with median household 
incomes below $34,000, 51 percent offer tax abatements and 27 percent offer tax credits; 
whereas among communities with median household incomes above $55,450, 23 percent offer 
tax abatements and only 7 percent offer tax credits.  Rates are much closer in the case of TIFs, 
which are provided by 33 percent of the low-income communities and 27 percent of the high-
income communities. 
  Table 4 presents estimated coefficients from logit regressions in which the sample 
consists of communities in two groups: those offering TIFs but not tax abatements or credits; and 
those offering tax abatements or tax credits (or both), but not TIFs.  This corresponds to the 
fixed-effects logit procedure proposed by Chamberlain (1980) in which there is an unobserved 
fixed effect – in this case, a desire to offer tax-based business development incentives.  The 
dependent variable in these regressions takes the value one if a community provides tax 
abatements or tax credits (or both) but not TIFs; the dependent variable is zero if instead the 
community provides TIFs but not abatements or credits.  The regressions in Table 4 use a much 
smaller sample than those presented in Table 3, since the sample consists only of the 346 
communities offering either tax abatements and credits (or just one of those) or TIFs, but not 
both.   16
The -1.5210 coefficient in the regression reported in the first column of Table 4 indicates 
that low-income communities are significantly more likely than others to offer abatements or 
credits rather than TIFs.  The coefficient implies that 10 percent lower median household income 
is associated with 3.4 percent greater likelihood of offering abatements or credits, conditional on 
offering any business tax incentives at all.  Communities with larger populations are more likely 
to offer TIFs – which is consistent with the evidence presented in Appendix Figure A1, that tax 
abatements are equally likely to be used in small and large jurisdictions while TIFs are much 
more likely to be used in larger cities. The -0.3502 coefficient implies that greater population is 
associated with significantly enhanced likelihood of offering TIFs, a 10 percent greater 
population being associated with a 0.8 percent greater likelihood of offering TIFs compared to 
abatements or credits. 
  Column 2 of Table 4 presents estimated coefficients from a specification that measures 
income effects by the fraction of households with incomes under $25,000 and the fraction of 
households with incomes between $25,000 and $75,000.  The 5.1677 coefficient indicates that, 
conditional on offering incentives of any kind, communities are significantly more likely to offer 
abatements or credits as the fraction of households with incomes below $25,000 increases.  The 
coefficient estimate implies that increasing the fraction of households with incomes below 
$25,000 by 10 percent is associated with an 11.4 percent greater likelihood of offering 
abatements or credits rather than TIFs.  The fraction of households in the $25,000-$75,000 range 
has the opposite effect, as indicated by the -5.4762 coefficient, which implies that increasing the 
fraction of households with incomes between $25,000 and $75,000 by 10 percent is associated 
with a 12.1 percent greater likelihood of offering TIFs rather than abatements or credits.  The 
10.6439 coefficient in the regression reported in column 3 confirms that this difference is 
statistically significant: TIFs are much more likely to be the incentive of choice for middle-
income communities, whereas tax abatements and credits are the incentives used by low-income 
communities. 
  Column 4 of Table 4 reports coefficients from a regression that adds to this specification 
the urbanization variable, which is the fraction of a community’s population using public 
transportation.  The implied effects of household income remain very similar to those in the 
regression reported in column 3, while the -8.8329 coefficient indicates that, conditional on 
offering some kind of business incentive, urban communities are much more likely to offer TIFs   17
than they are to offer abatements or credits.  The coefficient implies that increasing public 
transportation use by ten percent of the population (the mean value is 2.6 percent) is associated 
with a 19.4 percent greater likelihood of offering TIFs rather than abatements or credits.   
Columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 4 report regressions that replace the urbanization variable 
with, respectively, measures of population age, the fraction of the workforce employed in 
manufacturing, and distance to the nearest city center across the state border.  From the 
information depicted in Appendix Figure A2, it appears that communities with younger 
populations are more likely than others to offer TIFs, though this comparison does not condition 
on income; the regression in column 5 indicates that, conditioning on income, the effect of youth 
on TIF provision is statistically insignificant.   
The effects of the share of the workforce employed in manufacturing (column 6) is 
likewise insignificant, which is not surprising from casual inspection of Appendix Figure A3, in 
which both tax abatements and TIFs appear much more likely in jurisdictions with a high share 
of manufacturing employment. The regression in column 7 implies that jurisdictions closer to 
state borders are more likely to offer abatements or credits, the -0.3317 coefficient implying that 
increasing the distance to the nearest city center across the state border by 10 percent increases 
the likelihood of offering TIFs (as opposed to credits or abatements) by 0.7 percent. This 
distance result is consistent with Figure 3 which shows that abatements and credits are more 
likely to be offered in jurisdictions within 38.35 kilometers of a city center across the state 
border while TIF provision does not appear to depend on distance. Column 8 of Table 4 presents 
coefficients from a regression that includes all of these variables, with results that are similar to 
those obtained by including them separately – with the exception of population, which is no 
longer significant. 
  Table 5 presents estimated coefficients from regressions that add state-level variables to 
the specification reported in column 8 of Table 4.  In the regression reported in column 1 of 
Table 5, the -4.7123 coefficient on the log of tax revenue per capita indicates that communities 
located in states with ten percent larger per capita tax revenues are 10.0 percent more likely to 
provide TIFs than abatements or credits. The effect of tax revenue per capita becomes 
statistically insignificant in regressions controlling for state tax rates as shown in column 2 of 
Table 5. In the regression reported in column 2, higher state corporate, sales and personal tax   18
rates are associated with the provision of TIFs rather than abatements or credits. These results 
suggest that jurisdictions in states with better financed governments are more likely to offer TIFs 
as opposed to abatements or credits, very possibly reflecting the greater creditworthiness of local 
governments in those states. 
Tax abatements and tax credits are more likely to be offered in communities located in 
states with high rates of public corruption convictions, as evidenced in Figure 4, though there 
appears to be little discernable difference between the rates at which these communities offer 
TIFs. The regression reported in column 3 of Table 5 adds the state corruption rate variable to 
the specification presented in column 8 of Table 4.  The 0.3896 coefficient implies that 
increasing the number of public corruption convictions by one per 100,000 state residents over 
the 1990-2002 period, which is a 25 percent increase evaluated at the mean, is associated with a 
0.8 percent greater likelihood that a community providing business development incentives will 
offer abatements or credits rather than TIFs.  This effect persists at a slightly smaller magnitude 
in the regression reported in column 4 of Table 5, which includes the variables appearing in the 
regression reported in column 2, along with the corruption variable.  In the specification reported 
in column 4, communities providing business development tax incentives are significantly more 
likely to offer TIFs than abatements or credits if few of their households have incomes below 
$25,000, many have incomes between $25,000 and $75,000, a large fraction of the population 
uses public transportation, if the community is located far from the state border, and in a state 
with high tax rates and a relatively untroubled political culture. 
 
6.  TIF Financing and Infrastructure Productivity 
Perhaps the most striking regularity in the regressions presented in Tables 4 and 5 is that, 
among communities offering business incentives, those with the lowest incomes are the least 
likely to attempt to attract businesses with TIFs.  This empirical pattern suggests two 
possibilities.  The first is that infrastructure is relatively unproductive in very low-income 
communities, so governments find that resources devoted to tax abatements and credits are more 
effective in attracting business activity than would be the same resources devoted to 
infrastructure financed with TIFs.  The second interpretation of the evidence is that very low-
income communities are effectively unable to offer TIFs due to the difficulty of generating   19
incremental tax revenue sufficient to cover payments on TIF bonds (as suggested by Dye and 
Sundberg, 1998).  In the second interpretation, TIF-financed infrastructure might be productive 
but not in a way that can be relied upon to generate sufficient tax revenue, as a result of which 
the default premia required by the bond market make TIFs infeasible. 
One way to distinguish these interpretations of the evidence is to evaluate the extent to 
which the patterns that describe community expenditures on core infrastructure resemble patterns 
of TIF provision.  If the reason why low income communities offer tax incentives rather than 
TIFs is because infrastructure is unproductive, and infrastructure productivity is similar whether 
directly provided by governments or offered to businesses with TIFs, then infrastructure 
expenditures should be relatively concentrated in middle-income communities and not in low-
income communities.  Failure to find such an income pattern for infrastructure expenditure 
would not necessarily rule out productivity explanations of TIF provision, but would suggest that 
features of TIFs differ in important respects from other programs that provide infrastructure.  
In order to evaluate the extent to which the characteristics of communities providing 
significant amounts of core infrastructure may resemble those offering TIFs, it is helpful to have 
a measure of infrastructure provision that is constructed similarly to the TIF measure.  Of the 
1022 communities in the sample, 346 report offering TIFs in 1999.  Census of Governments data 
on community finances includes information on core infrastructure and total local government 
expenditures in 1997, from which it is possible to construct ratios of infrastructure to total 
spending; these ratios are useful measures of infrastructure intensity in part because they abstract 
from spending level differences across communities.  A dummy variable is assigned the value 
one for communities with infrastructure spending ratios above a cutoff level, and zero otherwise; 
the cutoff value of 41.95 percent is chosen to produce 346 communities with high infrastructure 
spending levels, the same number as that of communities offering TIFs. 
Appendix Figure A4 shows the rates at which communities of different incomes offer tax 
abatements, tax credits, tax increment financing, and concentrate their spending on public 
infrastructure.  Lower-income communities are much more likely than others to concentrate 
public expenditures on infrastructure, and to offer tax abatements and tax credits. In contrast, the 
likelihood of offering tax increment financing is only slightly higher among lower-income 
communities.   20
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equations similar to those appearing in Tables 4 
and 5, except that the infrastructure spending dummy variable is used in place of the TIF 
variable.  The sample of 463 observations includes communities that offer tax abatements or 
credits, or have high infrastructure expenditures as fractions of total spending, but not both.  It is 
clear that household incomes have very different effects in these regressions than they do in the 
corresponding regressions appearing in Tables 4 and 5.  The 1.1756 coefficient in the first 
column of Table 6 indicates that communities with higher fractions of households with incomes 
below $75,000 are somewhat more likely than others to offer tax credits or abatements than to 
provide significant infrastructure, though this effect is statistically insignificant.  The 
insignificant 0.1015 coefficient in the same column indicates that communities with higher 
fractions of households with incomes below $25,000 differ very little from others in the extent to 
which they provide infrastructure rather than offer tax abatements or credits.  Similar income 
coefficients appear in the regressions reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 6.  Estimated 
coefficients on the corruption and distance variables have the same signs and similar significance 
as those appearing in Tables 4 and 5, indicating that communities located near state borders and 
in states with troubled political cultures are more likely than others to offer tax abatements and 
credits rather than provide significant amounts of infrastructure. 
The regressions presented in Table 7 offer more direct comparisons of TIFs and publicly 
provided core infrastructure, the sample of 446 communities consisting of those that offer TIFs 
and those that have high infrastructure spending ratios, but not both.  The dependent variable in 
these regressions takes the value one if a community concentrates its government expenditures 
on core infrastructure, but does not offer TIFs; the dependent variable is zero if instead the 
community provides TIFs but does not concentrate its expenditures on core infrastructure. The -
4.6253 coefficient in the first column of Table 7 indicates that communities with higher fractions 
of households with incomes below $75,000 are more likely to offer TIFs than to provide 
significant infrastructure, and the 6.2077 coefficient in the same column indicates that this effect 
is somewhat more than reversed in the case of households with incomes below $25,000.  Similar 
income effects appear in the regressions appearing in columns 2 and 3.  Other coefficients 
indicate that communities with larger populations and higher fractions of residents using public 
transportation are more likely to offer TIFs than to provide large amounts of infrastructure,   21
though the effect of state corruption conviction rates is insignificant, indicating that political 
culture affects TIF provision and public infrastructure expenditures similarly. 
  The evidence in Tables 6 and 7 suggests that the attractiveness of TIFs to middle-income 
communities does not reflect their perceived value of infrastructure expenditures per se, since 
they do not concentrate their expenditures on infrastructure to any greater degree than do other 
communities.  This lends force to the interpretation that the financing mechanism that underlies 
TIF provision is responsible for the inability of low-income communities to participate in greater 
numbers, though it does not rule out other possibilities. 
 
7. Conclusion 
American cities and counties frequently offer business development incentives; variations 
in this practice suggest some of their motives in doing so.  Communities with low incomes, those 
located close to state borders, and those in states with more troubled political cultures are the 
most likely to provide incentives.  Among the incentives provided, the poorest communities 
prefer to offer tax abatements and credits rather than TIFs, whereas for middle-income 
communities TIFs are much more likely to be the incentive of choice. 
It is not difficult to understand the motives of low-income communities in seeking to 
attract greater business activity, with its accompanying economic opportunities for local 
residents, even if doing so entails foregoing potential sources of tax revenue.  Communities in 
particularly competitive environments, such as those located near to state borders, similarly often 
feel compelled to offer incentives in order to attract and retain business activity that may benefit 
local residents.   
The evidence on state political culture probably reflects the operation of more subtle 
considerations.  In the international context Dharmapala and Hines (2009) report that tax havens, 
which are zero- or very low-tax countries and territories, score higher on measures of governance 
quality than do higher-tax countries with similar incomes and populations.  The interpretation 
they offer is that the attractiveness of a low-tax environment would be insufficient to draw 
significant added business activity to a country otherwise plagued by bad governance and the 
economic problems that accompany it.  The costs of bad governance in American cities and   22
counties are doubtless considerably smaller than they are in some other parts of the world, but 
their potential to influence resource allocation is nonetheless quite real.  Tax havens operate by 
providing general tax relief to outside investors, which avoids at least some of the potential for 
insider deals and affords a more reliable business environment than one in which deals are 
individually negotiated and may need to be subsequently renewed.  Similarly, American 
communities in states with less troubled political cultures tend to avoid offering business 
incentives, presumably because they prefer to tailor their general tax levels, spending programs, 
and other policies to attract businesses without designing specific deals for specific firms and 
industries. 
Among communities that offer incentives there are clear patterns in which those with 
very poor residents, and those in states with more troubled political cultures, are less likely than 
others to provide TIFs.  TIFs can be financed only in cases in which it might be reasonably 
anticipated that tax revenues will rise as a result of greater infrastructure expenditures, and this 
design feature makes it very difficult to use them in the poorest of communities.  Troubled 
political cultures likewise impede the ability of communities to offer TIFs, and may also 
influence their desire to do so, since direct tax benefits in the form of abatements and credits may 
hold more appeal.  Communities are most likely to offer business development incentives when 
they stand to benefit from the resulting business activity and the economic environment makes it 
feasible, or – in the most competitive situations – almost irresistible, that they do so. 
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Figure 1:  Community Characteristics and Tax Incentives 
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Note: Bar heights depict fractions of communities offering any kind of tax-based business development incentive 
(tax abatements, tax credits, or TIFs).  The bars depict the behavior of communities with the highest and lowest 25 
percent of values of the attribute listed on the horizontal axis.  Low household income communities have median 
incomes below $34,000; high household income communities have median incomes above $55,450.  Small 
communities have populations below 19,307; large communities have populations exceeding 75,400.  In young 
communities the fraction of the population 18 years and under exceeds the fraction 65 years and over by more than 
18.9 percent; in old communities the difference between these fractions is less than 9.35 percent.  Communities have 
a low manufacturing employment share if less than 8.64 percent of the workforce is employed in manufacturing, and 
a high share if more than 18.3 percent is employed in manufacturing.  A state border is near if it is closer than 38.35 
kilometers, and far if its distance exceeds 220.5 kilometers.  State corruption is low if there were fewer than 2.5 
federal corruption convictions per 100,000 state residents between 1990-2002, whereas corruption is high if there 
were more than 5.4 convictions per 100,000 state residents. 
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Figure 2: Income Levels and Tax Incentive Alternatives 
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Note: The first pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering tax abatements; the second pair of bars depicts 
fractions of communities offering tax credits; the third pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering TIFs; 
and the fourth pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering any of these tax-based incentives.  In each pair 
the left bar corresponds to the 25 percent of the sample with median incomes below $34,000, and the right bar to the 
25 percent of the sample with median incomes exceeding $55,450. 
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Figure 3: Distances to State Borders and Tax Incentive Alternatives 
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Note: The first pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering tax abatements; the second pair of bars depicts 
fractions of communities offering tax credits; the third pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering TIFs; 
and the fourth pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering any of these tax-based incentives.  In each pair 
the left bar corresponds to the 25 percent of the sample within 38.35 kilometers of a state border, and the right bar to 
the 25 percent of the sample farther than 220.5 kilometers from a state border. 
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Figure 4: Public Corruption Convictions and Tax Incentive Alternatives  
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Note: The first pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering tax abatements; the second pair of bars depicts 
fractions of communities offering tax credits; the third pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering TIFs; 
and the fourth pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering any of these tax-based incentives.  In each pair 
the left bar corresponds to the 23.6 percent of the sample located in states in which there were fewer than 2.5 federal 
corruption convictions per 100,000 state residents between 1990-2002, and the right bar to the 24.2 percent of the 
sample located in states in which there were more than 5.4 convictions per 100,000 state residents.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation # of Observations
Offer any incentive 0.6840 0.4652 1022
Offer any tax incentive 0.5558 0.4971 1022
Offer tax abatement 0.3630 0.4811 1022
Offer tax credit 0.1673 0.3734 1022
Offer TIF 0.3386 0.4734 1022
Median household income 46814.76 17456.68 1022
Percent of HH earning less than $25,000 0.2705 0.1181 1022
Percent of HH earning $25,000 to $75,000 0.4834 0.0701 1022
Percent of HH earning less than $75,000 0.7539 0.1413 1022
Population 85734.39 182878.90 1022
Percent using public transportation 0.0258 0.0367 1022
Percent of population 65 and over ‐0.1395 0.0847 1022
      minus the percent 18 and under
Manufacturing (share of employment) 0.1415 0.0734 1022
Distance to nearest city across state border (meters) 129098.80 125311.50 988
County dummy 0.1243 0.3300 1022
TIF allowed by state government in 1999 0.8669 0.3398 1022
Local gov. infrastucture spending (% of total spending) 0.3541 0.1801 1018
State tax revenue per capita 1868.73 385.30 1022
State corporate tax rate 5.7427 3.3030 1022
State sales tax rate 5.3252 1.2018 1022
State personal income tax rate 5.2637 3.2595 1022
State corruption rate 3.9561 1.7520 1022
 
Note: The data summarized in this table characterize the 1022 American municipalities and counties providing 
usable replies to the ICMA survey in Fall 1999 and Spring 2000.  The dummy variable “Offer any incentive” takes 
the value 1 if a community reports offering any kind of tax- or non-tax business development incentive, and is zero 
otherwise.  The dummy variable “Offer any tax incentive” takes the value 1 if a community reports offering tax 
abatements, tax credits, or TIFs, and is zero otherwise.  The dummy variable “Offer tax abatement,” takes the value 
1 if a community reports offering tax abatements, and is zero otherwise.  The dummy variable “Offer tax credit,” 
takes the value 1 if a community reports offering tax credits, and is zero otherwise.  The dummy variable “Offer 
TIF,” takes the value 1 if a community reports offering tax increment financing, and is zero otherwise.  “Median 
household income” is drawn from the 2000 Census of Population for each community responding to the ICMA 
survey and represents 1999 income; “Percent of HH earning less than $25,000” is the percentage of community 
households earning less than $25,000 as reported in the 2000 Census of Population; similarly, “Percent of HH 
earning $25,000 to $75,000” is the percentage of community households earning between $25,000 and $75,000 as 
reported in the 2000 Census of Population, and “Percent of HH earning less than $75,000” is the percentage of 
community households earning less than $75,000 as reported in the 2000 Census of Population.  “Population” of 
ICMA respondents is drawn from the 2000 Census of Population.  “Percent using public transportation” is the 
fraction of the working population using public transportation to commute to work in 2000, as reported to the 2000 
Census of Population. “Percent of population 65 and over minus the percent 18 and under” is the difference between 
the fraction of a community’s population 65 years and older and the fraction 18 years and younger, as reported in the   31
2000 Census of Population.  “Manufacturing (share of employment)” is the fraction of a community’s workforce 
employed in manufacturing, as calculated from the 2000 Census of Population.  “Distance to the nearest city across 
state border (meters)” is the distance, in meters, to the closest city or town in another state, calculated on the basis of 
city centers using ArcGIS, and limited to the 988 observations for which precise geographic codes could be matched 
to communities in the ICMA survey.  “County dummy” takes the value 1 if a community is a county, and zero 
otherwise.  “TIF allowed by state government in 1999” takes the value 1 if the state in which a community is located 
had statutes permitting TIF use in 1999, as reported by the Council of Development Finance Agencies (2008), and is 
zero otherwise.  “Local gov. infrastructure spending (% of total spending)” is the ratio of community government 
spending on core infrastructure (air transportation, general public buildings, regular highways, toll highways, private 
transit subsidies, parking facilities, sewerage, solid waste, sea and inland port facilities, water utilities, electric 
utilities, gas utilities, and transit utilities) to total community government spending, as reported in the 1997 Census 
of Governments.  “State tax revenue per capita” is the ratio of total state tax revenue in 1999 to state population on 
July 1, 1999, both as reported in the U.S. Census Annual Survey of State Government Finances.  “State corporate 
tax rate” is the top statutory state corporate income tax rate in 1999 as reported in the World Tax Database (Office of 
Tax Policy Research, 2008) for the state in which a community is located.  “State sales tax rate” is the general state 
sales tax rate in 1999 as reported in the World Tax Database (Office of Tax Policy Research, 2008) for the state in 
which a community is located.  “State personal income tax rate” is the top statutory state personal income tax rate in 
1999 as reported in the World Tax Database (Office of Tax Policy Research, 2008) for the state in which a 
community is located.  “State corruption rate” is the number of public officials in the state in which a community is 
located convicted of federal corruption-related crimes between 1990 and 2002, per 100,000 state residents 
(measured as the average of 1990 and 2000 state population reported in the Census of Population), as reported by 
Glaeser and Saks (2004). 
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Table 2: Tax Incentives as Functions of Community Characteristics 
(Dependent variable equals 1 if a community offers any of tax abatements, tax credits, or TIFs, and equals zero 
otherwise.) 
V a r i a b l e 12345678
Ln (Median household income) ‐1.2936
(0.2053)
Percent of HH earning less than $25,000 3.0783 ‐1.1714 ‐0.9916 ‐0.9229 ‐0.3484 ‐0.8764 0.0299
(0.5757) (1.1700) (1.1744) (1.1822) (1.1940) (1.2067) (1.2373)
Percent of HH earning $25,000 to $75,000 4.2498
(1.0219)
Percent of HH earning less than $75,000 4.2498 3.9217 4.2516 3.5275 4.3317 3.5272
(1.0219) (1.0385) (1.0235) (1.0399) (1.0681) (1.0954)
Ln(Population) 0.3102 0.3189 0.3189 0.3389 0.3063 0.3633 0.4141 0.4562
(0.0820) (0.0825) (0.0825) (0.0835) (0.0830) (0.0841) (0.0880) (0.0908)
Percent using public transportation ‐3.4491 ‐3.6543
(2.0675) (2.1927)
Percent of population 65 and over ‐1.5127 ‐1.1466
      minus the percent 18 and under (0.8162) (0.8421)
Manufacturing (share of employment) 3.3882 2.1907
(0.9695) (1.0244)
Ln (Distance to nearest city across state border) ‐0.2759 ‐0.2728
(0.0683) (0.0709)
County dummy ‐0.7787 ‐0.8576 ‐0.8576 ‐0.9227 ‐0.8300 ‐0.8899 ‐1.0489 ‐1.1190
(0.2491) (0.2508) (0.2508) (0.2539) (0.2514) (0.2521) (0.2596) (0.2659)
TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs) 1.4658 1.4454 1.4454 1.4170 1.4238 1.4839 1.6000 1.5822
(0.2145) (0.2152) (0.2152) (0.2165) (0.2158) (0.2181) (0.2252) (0.2287)
Observations 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022 1022 988 988
 
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if a 
community offers any of tax abatements, tax credits, or TIFs, and equals zero otherwise.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  “Ln (Median household income)” is the natural log of community median household income in 1999; 
“Percent of HH earning less than $25,000” is the percentage of community households earning less than $25,000 in 
1999; similarly, “Percent of HH earning $25,000 to $75,000” is the percentage of community households earning 
between $25,000 and $75,000 in 1999, and “Percent of HH earning less than $75,000” is the percentage of 
community households earning less than $75,000 in 1999.  “Ln (Population)” is the natural log of community 
population in 2000.  “Percent using public transportation” is the fraction of the working population using public 
transportation to commute to work in 2000. “Percent of population 65 and over minus the percent 18 and under” is 
the difference in 2000 between the fraction of a community’s population 65 years and older and the fraction 18 years 
and younger.  “Manufacturing (share of employment)” is the fraction of a community’s workforce employed in 
manufacturing in 2000.  “Ln (Distance to the nearest city across state border)” is the natural logarithm of the 
distance, in meters, to the closest city or town in another state.  “County dummy” takes the value 1 if a community is 
a county, and zero otherwise.  “TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs)” takes the value 1 if the state in which a 
community is located had statutes permitting TIF use in 1999, and is zero otherwise. 
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Table 3: Tax Incentives as Functions of Community and State Characteristics 
(Dependent variable equals 1 if a community offers any of tax abatements, tax credits, or TIFs, and equals zero 
otherwise.) 
V a r i a b l e 1234
Percent of HH earning less than $25,000 0.0633 ‐0.0824 ‐0.0922 ‐0.2837
(1.2370) (1.2654) (1.2445) (1.2737)
Percent of HH earning less than $75,000 3.6075 3.9009 3.6392 4.0629
(1.0985) (1.1234) (1.1009) (1.1300)
Ln(Population) 0.4539 0.4240 0.4649 0.4306
(0.0907) (0.0931) (0.0912) (0.0933)
Percent using public transportation ‐4.1711 ‐3.6566 ‐4.3187 ‐4.8615
(2.2458) (2.2734) (2.2376) (2.3510)
Percent of population 65 and over ‐1.1609 ‐0.3703 ‐1.4917 ‐0.7740
      minus the percent 18 and under (0.8443) (0.8753) (0.8659) (0.8941)
Manufacturing (share of employment) 1.9892 1.1001 2.3636 1.1529
(1.0391) (1.0823) (1.0315) (1.0866)
Ln (Distance to nearest city across state border) ‐0.2800 ‐0.3872 ‐0.2809 ‐0.3970
(0.0713) (0.0769) (0.0711) (0.0771)
Ln (State tax revenue per capita) 0.4318 ‐0.1855 0.2157
(0.3679) (0.6185) (0.6388)
State corporate tax rate ‐0.1114 ‐0.1305
(0.0299) (0.0317)
State sales tax rate 0.3162 0.2860
(0.0774) (0.0790)
State personal income tax rate 0.1153 0.1267
(0.0343) (0.0351)
State corruption rate 0.0776 0.1176
(0.0425) (0.0488)
County dummy ‐1.1201 ‐0.9335 ‐1.1629 ‐0.9926
(0.2659) (0.2724) (0.2678) (0.2741)
TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs) 1.6270 1.6191 1.4843 1.5136
(0.2320) (0.2393) (0.2352) (0.2432)
Observations 988 988 988 988
 
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if a 
community offers any of tax abatements, tax credits, or TIFs, and equals zero otherwise.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  “Percent of HH earning less than $25,000” is the percentage of community households earning less 
than $25,000 in 1999; similarly, “Percent of HH earning less than $75,000” is the percentage of community 
households earning less than $75,000 in 1999.  “Ln (Population)” is the natural log of community population in 
2000.  “Percent using public transportation” is the fraction of the working population using public transportation to 
commute to work in 2000. “Percent of population 65 and over minus the percent 18 and under” is the difference in 
2000 between the fraction of a community’s population 65 years and older and the fraction 18 years and younger.  
“Manufacturing (share of employment)” is the fraction of a community’s workforce employed in manufacturing in 
2000.  “Ln (Distance to the nearest city across state border)” is the natural logarithm of the distance, in meters, to the 
closest city or town in another state.  “Ln (State tax revenue per capita)” is the natural log of the ratio of total state 
tax revenue in 1999 to state population on July 1, 1999.  “State corporate tax rate” is the top statutory state corporate 
income tax rate in 1999, “State sales tax rate” is the general state sales tax rate in 1999, and “State personal income 
tax rate” is the top statutory state personal income tax rate in 1999, all for the state in which a community is located.  
“State corruption rate” is the number of public officials in the state in which a community is located convicted of 
federal corruption-related crimes between 1990 and 2002, per 100,000 state residents.  “County dummy” takes the 
value 1 if a community is a county, and zero otherwise.  “TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs)” takes the value 1 if 
the state in which a community is located had statutes permitting TIF use in 1999, and is zero otherwise. 
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Table 4: Tax Abatements and Credits v. TIFs, as Functions of Community Characteristics 
(Dependent variable equals 1 if a community offers tax abatements and/or tax credits, but not TIFs; and equals zero 
if a community offers TIFs but not tax abatements or credits.) 
V a r i a b l e 12345678
Ln (Median household income) ‐1.5210
(0.3818)
Percent of HH earning less than $25,000 5.1677 10.6439 10.9591 10.6067 11.5758 11.0683 12.1064
(1.1314) (2.3115) (2.3385) (2.3248) (2.4170) (2.3636) (2.5073)
Percent of HH earning $25,000 to $75,000 ‐5.4762
(1.9151)
Percent of HH earning less than $75,000 ‐5.4762 ‐5.9258 ‐5.4999 ‐6.2879 ‐5.0629 ‐6.0726
(1.9151) (1.9487) (1.9224) (2.0056) (1.9599) (2.1075)
Ln(Population) ‐0.3502 ‐0.3713 ‐0.3713 ‐0.3101 ‐0.3694 ‐0.3205 ‐0.2043 ‐0.0870
(0.1547) (0.1597) (0.1597) (0.1631) (0.1602) (0.1638) (0.1739) (0.1825)
Percent using public transportation ‐8.8329 ‐9.9701
(4.0301) (4.2156)
Percent of population 65 and over 0.2207 ‐0.1717
      minus the percent 18 and under (1.5450) (1.5985)
Manufacturing (share of employment) 2.8957 1.8835
(1.9682) (2.1053)
Ln (Distance to nearest city across state border) ‐0.3317 ‐0.3755
(0.1341) (0.1405)
County dummy 1.6608 1.7689 1.7689 1.6046 1.7611 1.7579 1.4865 1.2557
(0.5017) (0.5039) (0.5039) (0.5135) (0.5066) (0.5078) (0.5230) (0.5439)
TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs) ‐1.1131 ‐1.1861 ‐1.1861 ‐1.3882 ‐1.1820 ‐1.1993 ‐0.8823 ‐1.1029
(0.5781) (0.5877) (0.5879) (0.6117) (0.5887) (0.5922) (0.6142) (0.6452)
Observations 346 346 346 346 346 346 332 332
 
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if a 
community offers tax abatements and/or tax credits, but not TIFs; and equals zero if a community offers TIFs but 
not tax abatements or credits.  The sample is restricted to communities offering tax credits and/or abatements, but 
not TIFs, and communities offering TIFs but not tax abatements or credits.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  “Ln 
(Median household income)” is the natural log of community median household income in 1999; “Percent of HH 
earning less than $25,000” is the percentage of community households earning less than $25,000 in 1999; similarly, 
“Percent of HH earning $25,000 to $75,000” is the percentage of community households earning between $25,000 
and $75,000 in 1999, and “Percent of HH earning less than $75,000” is the percentage of community households 
earning less than $75,000 in 1999.  “Ln (Population)” is the natural log of community population in 2000.  “Percent 
using public transportation” is the fraction of the working population using public transportation to commute to 
work in 2000. “Percent of population 65 and over minus the percent 18 and under” is the difference in 2000 between 
the fraction of a community’s population 65 years and older and the fraction 18 years and younger.  “Manufacturing 
(share of employment)” is the fraction of a community’s workforce employed in manufacturing in 2000.  “Ln 
(Distance to the nearest city across state border)” is the natural logarithm of the distance, in meters, to the closest 
city or town in another state.  “County dummy” takes the value 1 if a community is a county, and zero otherwise.  
“TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs)” takes the value 1 if the state in which a community is located had statutes 
permitting TIF use in 1999, and is zero otherwise. 
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Table 5: Tax Abatements and Credits v. TIFs, as Functions of Community and State Characteristics 
(Dependent variable equals 1 if a community offers tax abatements and/or tax credits, but not TIFs; and equals zero 
if a community offers TIFs but not tax abatements or credits.) 
V a r i a b l e 1234
Percent of HH earning less than $25,000 11.8563 12.9006 11.5483 12.4904
(2.7456) (2.8896) (2.6580) (2.9964)
Percent of HH earning less than $75,000 ‐6.5579 ‐7.5627 ‐5.2712 ‐6.9661
(2.3694) (2.5387) (2.2211) (2.6193)
Ln(Population) ‐0.1134 ‐0.1411 ‐0.0957 ‐0.1426
(0.2006) (0.2078) (0.1921) (0.2120)
Percent using public transportation ‐5.9448 ‐6.2805 ‐13.6380 ‐9.5064
(4.2952) (4.3588) (4.4376) (4.5899)
Percent of population 65 and over 0.2129 ‐0.9507 ‐2.5232 ‐2.5069
      minus the percent 18 and under (1.7457) (1.8832) (1.7345) (1.9834)
Manufacturing (share of employment) 3.8819 3.3565 1.6143 2.7703
(2.3223) (2.4646) (2.2050) (2.4940)
Ln (Distance to nearest city across state border) ‐0.3728 ‐0.2731 ‐0.4847 ‐0.3369
(0.1520) (0.1580) (0.1487) (0.1616)
Ln (State tax revenue per capita) ‐4.7123 ‐0.8930 0.2560
(0.7510) (1.3666) (1.4434)
State corporate tax rate ‐0.1404 ‐0.1618
(0.0685) (0.0704)
State sales tax rate ‐0.4472 ‐0.5272
(0.1755) (0.1824)
State personal income tax rate ‐0.1642 ‐0.1547
(0.0701) (0.0721)
State corruption rate 0.3896 0.2757
(0.0857) (0.0990)
County dummy 1.3218 1.2700 1.1187 1.2131
(0.5719) (0.5838) (0.5605) (0.5991)
TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs) ‐1.6372 ‐1.3472 ‐1.4604 ‐1.4331
(0.6827) (0.6732) (0.6734) (0.6803)
Observations 332 332 332 332
 
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if a 
community offers tax abatements and/or tax credits, but not TIFs; and equals zero if a community offers TIFs but 
not tax abatements or credits.  The sample is restricted to communities offering tax credits and/or abatements, but 
not TIFs, and communities offering TIFs but not tax abatements or credits.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
“Percent of HH earning less than $25,000” is the percentage of community households earning less than $25,000 in 
1999; similarly, “Percent of HH earning less than $75,000” is the percentage of community households earning less 
than $75,000 in 1999.  “Ln (Population)” is the natural log of community population in 2000.  “Percent using public 
transportation” is the fraction of the working population using public transportation to commute to work in 2000. 
“Percent of population 65 and over minus the percent 18 and under” is the difference in 2000 between the fraction of 
a community’s population 65 years and older and the fraction 18 years and younger.  “Manufacturing (share of 
employment)” is the fraction of a community’s workforce employed in manufacturing in 2000.  “Ln (Distance to the 
nearest city across state border)” is the natural logarithm of the distance, in meters, to the closest city or town in 
another state.  “Ln (State tax revenue per capita)” is the natural log of the ratio of total state tax revenue in 1999 to 
state population on July 1, 1999.  “State corporate tax rate” is the top statutory state corporate income tax rate in 
1999, “State sales tax rate” is the general state sales tax rate in 1999, and “State personal income tax rate” is the top 
statutory state personal income tax rate in 1999, all for the state in which a community is located.  “State corruption 
rate” is the number of public officials in the state in which a community is located convicted of federal corruption-
related crimes between 1990 and 2002, per 100,000 state residents.  “County dummy” takes the value 1 if a 
community is a county, and zero otherwise.  “TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs)” takes the value 1 if the state in 
which a community is located had statutes permitting TIF use in 1999, and is zero otherwise. 
 
   36
Table 6: Tax Abatements and Credits v. Infrastructure Spending, as Functions of Community and State 
Characteristics 
(Dependent variable equals 1 if a community offers tax abatements and/or tax credits, but does not concentrate its 
government expenditures on core infrastructure; and equals zero if a community concentrates its government 
expenditures on core infrastructure, but does not offer tax abatements or credits.) 
V a r i a b l e 123
Percent of HH earning less than $25,000 0.1015 0.5039 1.0451
(1.6390) (1.7917) (1.9275)
Percent of HH earning less than $75,000 1.1756 2.1466 2.1530
(1.5063) (1.6933) (1.7966)
Ln(population) 0.3965 0.5132 0.5609
(0.1250) (0.1405) (0.1506)
Percent using public transportation 13.4462 9.0197
(4.7368) (4.8670)
Percent of population 65 and over 0.6267 ‐0.0674
      minus the percent 18 and under (1.4097) (1.5500)
Manufacturing (share of employment) 1.3063 ‐0.0509
(1.5670) (1.7456)
Ln (Distance to nearest city across state border) ‐0.4182 ‐0.5435
(0.1177) (0.1259)
Ln (State tax revenue per capita) 2.3837
(0.9858)
State corporate tax rate ‐0.2428
(0.0522)
State sales tax rate 0.0871
(0.1255)
State personal income tax rate 0.1001
(0.0575)
State corruption rate 0.3591
(0.0778)
County dummy 1.9856 1.9906 2.0951
(0.6420) (0.6568) (0.6757)
TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs) 1.0660 1.4387 1.2346
(0.3182) (0.3579) (0.3758)
Observations 463 444 444
 
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if a 
community offers tax abatements and/or tax credits, but does not concentrate its government expenditures on core 
infrastructure; and equals zero if a community concentrates its government expenditures on core infrastructure, but 
does not offer tax abatements or credits.  Communities are defined to concentrate their government expenditures on 
core infrastructure if the sum of expenditures on air transportation, general public buildings, regular highways, toll 
highways, private transit subsidies, parking facilities, sewerage, solid waste, sea and inland port facilities, water 
utilities, electric utilities, gas utilities, and transit utilities exceeds 41.95 percent of total community government 
spending in 1997. The sample is restricted to communities offering tax credits and/or abatements, but not 
concentrating their expenditures on core infrastructure, and communities concentrating expenditures on core 
infrastructure but not offering tax abatements or credits.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  “Percent of HH earning 
less than $25,000” is the percentage of community households earning less than $25,000 in 1999; similarly, “Percent 
of HH earning less than $75,000” is the percentage of community households earning less than $75,000 in 1999.  
“Ln (Population)” is the natural log of community population in 2000.  “Percent using public transportation” is the 
fraction of the working population using public transportation to commute to work in 2000. “Percent of population 
65 and over minus the percent 18 and under” is the difference in 2000 between the fraction of a community’s 
population 65 years and older and the fraction 18 years and younger.  “Manufacturing (share of employment)” is the 
fraction of a community’s workforce employed in manufacturing in 2000.  “Ln (Distance to the nearest city across 
state border)” is the natural logarithm of the distance, in meters, to the closest city or town in another state.  “Ln 
(State tax revenue per capita)” is the natural log of the ratio of total state tax revenue in 1999 to state population on 
July 1, 1999.  “State corporate tax rate” is the top statutory state corporate income tax rate in 1999, “State sales tax   37
rate” is the general state sales tax rate in 1999, and “State personal income tax rate” is the top statutory state 
personal income tax rate in 1999, all for the state in which a community is located.  “State corruption rate” is the 
number of public officials in the state in which a community is located convicted of federal corruption-related 
crimes between 1990 and 2002, per 100,000 state residents.  “County dummy” takes the value 1 if a community is a 
county, and zero otherwise.  “TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs)” takes the value 1 if the state in which a 
community is located had statutes permitting TIF use in 1999, and is zero otherwise. 
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Table 7: Infrastructure Spending v. TIFs, as Functions of Community and State Characteristics 
(Dependent variable equals 1 if a community concentrates its government expenditures on core infrastructure, but 
does not offer TIFs; and equals zero if a community offers TIFs, but does not concentrate its government 
expenditures on core infrastructure.) 
V a r i a b l e 123
Percent of HH earning less than $25,000 6.2077 6.7099 6.1167
(1.8088) (1.9461) (2.1337)
Percent of HH earning less than $75,000 ‐4.6253 ‐5.9970 ‐7.0045
(1.6865) (1.8456) (2.0317)
Ln(population) ‐0.6469 ‐0.6546 ‐0.6570
(0.1319) (0.1432) (0.1518)
Percent using public transportation ‐24.1988 ‐18.9583
(5.1684) (5.4528)
Percent of population 65 and over ‐1.6484 ‐2.2014
      minus the percent 18 and under (1.3808) (1.5298)
Manufacturing (share of employment) ‐1.3284 1.9176
(1.6161) (1.8818)
Ln (Distance to nearest city across state border) 0.1426 0.2678
(0.1111) (0.1272)
Ln (State tax revenue per capita) ‐3.4084
(1.1069)
State corporate tax rate 0.1239
(0.0509)
State sales tax rate ‐0.4645
(0.1462)
State personal income tax rate ‐0.1426
(0.0573)
State corruption rate ‐0.0823
(0.0796)
County dummy ‐0.9519 ‐1.1971 ‐1.3025
(0.6818) (0.6962) (0.7177)
TIF dummy (1 if state allows TIFs) ‐1.3086 ‐1.4998 ‐1.7744
(0.3586) (0.3802) (0.4305)
Observations 446 441 441
 
Note: The table reports estimated coefficients from logit regressions in which the dependent variable equals 1 if a 
community concentrates its government expenditures on core infrastructure, but does not offer TIFs; and equals zero 
if a community offers TIFs, but does not concentrate its government expenditures on core infrastructure.  
Communities are defined to concentrate their government expenditures on core infrastructure if the sum of 
expenditures on air transportation, general public buildings, regular highways, toll highways, private transit 
subsidies, parking facilities, sewerage, solid waste, sea and inland port facilities, water utilities, electric utilities, gas 
utilities, and transit utilities exceeds 41.95 percent of total community government spending in 1997. The sample is 
restricted to communities concentrating their government expenditures on core infrastructure, but not offering TIFs, 
and communities offering TIFs, but not concentrating their government expenditures on core infrastructure.  
Standard errors are in parentheses.  “Percent of HH earning less than $25,000” is the percentage of community 
households earning less than $25,000 in 1999; similarly, “Percent of HH earning less than $75,000” is the 
percentage of community households earning less than $75,000 in 1999.  “Ln (Population)” is the natural log of 
community population in 2000.  “Percent using public transportation” is the fraction of the working population using 
public transportation to commute to work in 2000. “Percent of population 65 and over minus the percent 18 and 
under” is the difference in 2000 between the fraction of a community’s population 65 years and older and the 
fraction 18 years and younger.  “Manufacturing (share of employment)” is the fraction of a community’s workforce 
employed in manufacturing in 2000.  “Ln (Distance to the nearest city across state border)” is the natural logarithm 
of the distance, in meters, to the closest city or town in another state.  “Ln (State tax revenue per capita)” is the 
natural log of the ratio of total state tax revenue in 1999 to state population on July 1, 1999.  “State corporate tax 
rate” is the top statutory state corporate income tax rate in 1999, “State sales tax rate” is the general state sales tax 
rate in 1999, and “State personal income tax rate” is the top statutory state personal income tax rate in 1999, all for   39
the state in which a community is located.  “State corruption rate” is the number of public officials in the state in 
which a community is located convicted of federal corruption-related crimes between 1990 and 2002, per 100,000 
state residents.  “County dummy” takes the value 1 if a community is a county, and zero otherwise.  “TIF dummy (1 
if state allows TIFs)” takes the value 1 if the state in which a community is located had statutes permitting TIF use 
in 1999, and is zero otherwise. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure A1: Population Size and Tax Incentive Alternatives 
Percent of respondents offering incentive
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Note: The first pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering tax abatements; the second pair of bars depicts 
fractions of communities offering tax credits; the third pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering TIFs; 
and the fourth pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering any of these tax-based incentives.  In each pair 
the left bar corresponds to the 25 percent of communities in the sample with fewer than 19,307 residents, and the 
right bar to the 25 percent of communities in the sample with more than 75,400 residents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   41
Figure A2: Population Ages and Tax Incentive Alternatives 
Percent of respondents offering incentive
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Note: The first pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering tax abatements; the second pair of bars depicts 
fractions of communities offering tax credits; the third pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering TIFs; 
and the fourth pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering any of these tax-based incentives.  In each pair 
the left bar corresponds to the 25 percent of communities in which the fraction of the population 18 years and under 
exceeds the fraction 65 years and over by more than 18.9 percent, and the right bar to the 25 percent of communities 
in which the difference between these fractions is less than 9.35 percent. 
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Figure A3: Manufacturing Employment and Tax Incentive Alternatives 
Percent of respondents offering incentive
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Note: The first pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering tax abatements; the second pair of bars depicts 
fractions of communities offering tax credits; the third pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering TIFs; 
and the fourth pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering any of these tax-based incentives.  In each pair 
the left bar corresponds to the 25 percent of communities in which less than 8.64 percent of the workforce is 
employed in manufacturing, and the right bar to the 25 percent of communities in which more than 18.3 percent is 
employed in manufacturing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   43
Figure A4: Income Levels, Tax Incentives and Infrastructure Spending 
Percent of respondents offering
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Note: The first pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering tax abatements; the second pair of bars depicts 
fractions of communities offering tax credits; the third pair of bars depicts fractions of communities offering TIFs; 
and the fourth pair of bars depicts fractions of communities whose expenditures on core infrastructure exceed 41.95 
percent of total government spending.  (The 41.95 percent cutoff level is chosen so that the number of communities 
defined to have high infrastructure spending equals the number offering TIFs.)  In each pair the left bar corresponds 
to the 25 percent of the sample with median incomes below $34,000, and the right bar to the 25 percent of the 
sample with median incomes exceeding $55,450. 
 